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We introduce a new class of games where each player’s aim is to randomise her strategic choices
in order to affect the other players’ expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends
to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and
inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a
computational study of the existence of equilibria.1
1 Introduction
In the situations of strategic interactions modelled in Game Theory, the goal of each player is essentially
the maximisation of her own expected payoff. Players, however, often care not only about maximising
their own expectation, but also about influencing other players’ expected outcomes. As an example, con-
sider a number of competing investment banks selling and buying tradable assets so that the trading of
financial products affects each other’s profit. These banks might randomize their choices and obviously
aim at maximizing their expected profit. Still, their strategy might go beyond the choice of a specific in-
vestment and they might be interested in influencing the market and the behavior of other banks possibly
undermining the expected gain of their competitors.
In this work, we offer logical models to formalize these kinds of strategic interactions, called Ex-
pectation Games, where each player’s aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the
other players’ expectations over an outcome as well as their own expectation. Expectation Games are an
extension of Łukasiewicz games [9] and are based on the logics E(G) that formalise reasoning about ex-
pected payoffs in a class of Łukasiewicz games [4]. Łukasiewicz games [9], a generalisation of Boolean
games [7], involve a finite set of players Pi each controlling a finite set of propositional variables Vi,
whose strategy corresponds to assigning values from the scale Lk =
{
0, 1k , . . . ,
k−1
k ,1
}
to the variables in
Vi. Strategies can be interpreted as efforts or costs, and each player’s strategic choice can be seen as an
assignment to each controlled variable carrying an intrinsic cost. Each player is given a finitely-valued
Łukasiewicz logic formula ϕi, with variables from
⋃n
i Vi, whose valuation is interpreted as the payoff
function for Pi and corresponds to the restriction over Lk of a continuous piecewise linear polynomial
function [2].
Expectation Games expand Lukasiewicz games by assigning to each player Pi a modal formula Φi
of the logic E(G), whose interpretation corresponds to a piecewise rational polynomial function whose
variables are interpreted as the expected values of the payoff functions ϕi. Each formula Φi is then meant
to represent a player’s goal concerning the relation between her and other players’ expectations.
1This extended abstract is based on the article [4] and an upcoming extended version of the same work.
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2 Logical Background
The language of Łukasiewicz logic Ł (see [2]) is built from a countable set of propositional variables
{p1, p2, . . .}, the binary connective → and the truth constant 0 (for falsity). Further connectives are
defined as follows:
¬ϕ is ϕ → ¯0, ϕ ∧ψ is ϕ&(ϕ → ψ),
ϕ&ψ is ¬(ϕ →¬ψ), ϕ ∨ψ is ((ϕ → ψ)→ ψ),
ϕ ⊕ψ is ¬(¬ϕ&¬ψ), ϕ ↔ ψ is (ϕ → ψ)&(ψ → ϕ),
ϕ ⊖ψ is ϕ&¬ψ , d(ϕ ,ψ) is ¬(ϕ ↔ ψ).
Let Form denote the set of Łukasiewicz logic formulas. A valuation e from Form into [0,1] is a
mapping e : Form → [0,1] assigning to all propositional variables a value from the real unit interval (with
e(0) = 0) that can be extended to complex formulas as follows:
e(ϕ → ψ) = min(1− e(ϕ)+ e(ψ),1) e(¬ϕ) = 1− e(ϕ)
e(ϕ&ψ) = max(0,e(ϕ)+ e(ψ)−1) e(ϕ ⊕ψ) = min(1,e(ϕ)+ e(ψ))
e(ϕ ⊖ψ) = max(0,e(ϕ)− e(ψ)) e(ϕ ∧ψ) = min(e(ϕ),e(ψ))
e(ϕ ∨ψ) = max(e(ϕ),e(ψ)) e(d(ϕ ,ψ)) = |e(ϕ)− e(ψ)|
e(ϕ ↔ ψ) = 1−|e(ϕ)− e(ψ)|
A valuation e satisfies a formula ϕ if e(ϕ) = 1. As usual, a set of formulas is called a theory. A valuation
e satisfies a theory T , if e(ψ) = 1, for every ψ ∈ T .
Infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic has the following axiomatisation:
(Ł1) ϕ → (ψ → ϕ), (Ł2) (ϕ → ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ → χ)),
(Ł3) (¬ϕ →¬ψ)→ (ψ → ϕ), (Ł4) ((ϕ → ψ)→ ψ)→ ((ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ).
The only inference rule is modus ponens, i.e.: from ϕ → ψ and ϕ derive ψ .
A proof in Ł is a sequence ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn of formulas such that each ϕi either is an axiom of Ł or follows
from some preceding ϕ j,ϕk ( j,k < i) by modus ponens. We say that a formula ϕ can be derived from a
theory T , denoted as T ⊢ ϕ , if there is a proof of ϕ from a set T ′ ⊆ T . A theory T is said to be consistent
if T 6⊢ 0.
Łukasiewicz logic is complete with respect to deductions from finite theories for the given semantics,
i.e.: for every finite theory T and every formula ϕ , T ⊢ ϕ iff every valuation e that satisfies T also satisfies
ϕ .
For each k ∈N, the finite-valued Łukasiewicz logic Łk is the schematic extension of Ł with the axiom
schemas:
(Ł5) (n−1)ϕ ↔ nϕ , (Ł6) (kϕk−1)n ↔ nϕk,
for each integer k = 2, . . . ,n−2 that does not divide n−1, and where nϕ is an abbreviation for ϕ⊕·· ·⊕ϕ
(n times) and ϕk is an abbreviation for ϕ& . . .&ϕ , (k times). The notions of valuation and satisfiability
for Łk are defined as above just replacing [0,1] by
Lk =
{
0, 1k , . . . ,
k−1
k ,1
}
as set of truth values. Every Łk is complete (in the above sense) with respect to deductions from finite
theories for the given semantics.
It is sometimes useful to introduce constants in addition to 0 that will denote values in the domain
Lk. Specifically, we will denote by Łck the Łukasiewicz logic obtained by adding constants c for every
value c ∈ Lk. We assume that valuation functions e interpret such constants in the natural way: e(c) = c.
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A McNaughton function [2] is a continuous piecewise linear polynomial functions with integer co-
efficients over the nth-cube [0,1]n. To each Łukasiewicz formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) we can associate a Mc-
Naughton function fϕ so that, for every valuation e
fϕ(e(p1), . . . ,e(pn)) = e(ϕ(p1, . . . , pn)).
Every Ł-formula is then said to define a McNaughton function. The converse is also true, i.e. every
continuous piecewise linear polynomial function with integer coefficients over [0,1]n is definable by a
formula in Łukasiewicz logic. In the case of finite-valued Łukasiewicz logics, the functions defined by
formulas are just the restrictions of McNaughton functions over (Lk)n. In this sense, we can associate to
every formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) from Łk a function fϕ : (Lk)n → Lk. As for each Łck, the functions defined
by a formula are combinations of restrictions of McNaughton functions and, in addition, the constant
functions for each c ∈ Lk. The class of functions definable by Łck-formulas exactly coincides with the
class of all functions f : (Lk)n → Lk, for every n≥ 0.
The expressive power of infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic lies in, and is limited to, the definability
of piecewise linear polynomial functions. Expanding Ł with the connectives ⊙,→Π of Product logic [6],
interpreted as the product of reals and as the truncated division, respectively, significantly augments the
expressive power of the logic. The ŁΠ 12 logic [3] is the result of this expansion, obtained by adding the
connectives ⊙,→Π, 12 , whose valuations e extend the valuations for Ł as follows:
e(ϕ ⊙ψ) = e(ϕ) · e(ψ), e(ϕ →Π ψ) =
{
1 e(ϕ)≤ e(ψ)
e(ψ)
eϕ otherwise
, e
(
1
2
)
= 12 .
Notice that the presence of the constant 12 makes it possible to define constants for all rationals in [0,1]
(see [3]). ŁΠ 12 ’s axioms include the axioms of Łukasiewicz and Product logics (see [6]) as well as the
following additional axioms, where ∆ϕ is ¬ϕ →Π 0:
(ŁΠ1) (ϕ ⊙ψ)⊖ (ϕ⊙ χ)↔ ϕ ⊙ (ψ⊖ χ),
(ŁΠ2) ∆(ϕ → ψ)→ (ϕ →Π ψ),
(ŁΠ3) ∆(ϕ →Π ψ)→ (ϕ → ψ),
(ŁΠ4) 12 ↔¬
1
2 .
The deduction rules are modus ponens for & and →, and the necessitation rule for ∆, i.e.: from ϕ derive
∆ϕ . ŁΠ 12 is complete with respect to deductions from finite theories for the given semantics [3].
While Ł is the logic of McNaughton functions, ŁΠ 12 is the logic of piecewise rational functions
over [0,1]n, for all n (see [10]). In fact, the function defined by each ŁΠ 12 -formula with n variables
corresponds to a supremum of rational fractions
P(x1, . . . ,xn)
Q(x1, . . . ,xn)
over [0,1]n, where P(x1, . . . ,xn),Q(x1, . . . ,xn) are polynomials with rational coefficients. Conversely,
every piecewise rational function with over the unit cube [0,1]n can be defined by an ŁΠ 12 -formula.
3 Logics for Łukasiewicz Games with Expectations
In this section we briefly introduce Łukasiewicz games on Łck along with the logics E(G) to represent
expected payoffs in classes of games. E(G) will be the basis upon which Expectation Games are defined.
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3.1 Łukasiewicz Games
Definition 3.1 ([9]) A Łukasiewicz game G on Łck is a tuple G = 〈P,V,{Vi},{Si},{ϕi}〉 where:
1. P= {P1, . . . ,Pn} is a set of players;
2. V = {p1, . . . , pm} is a finite set of propositional variables;
3. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, Vi ⊆ V is the set of propositional variables under control of player Pi, so
that the sets Vi form a partition of V, with |Vi|= mi, and ∑ni=1 mi = m.
4. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, Si is the strategy set for player Pi that consists of all valuations s : Vi → Lk
of the propositional variables in Vi, i.e. Si = {s | s : Vi → Lk}.
5. For each i∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ϕi(p1, . . . , pt) is an Łck-formula, built from variables in V, whose associated
function fϕi : (Lk)t → Lk corresponds to the payoff function of Pi, and whose value is determined
by the valuations in {S1, . . . ,Sn}.
We denote by S = S1 × ·· ·× Sn the product of the strategy spaces. A tuple ~s = (s1, . . . ,sn) ∈ S of
strategies is called a strategy combination. With an abuse of notation, we denote by fϕi(~s) the value of
the payoff function fϕi under the valuation corresponding to the strategy combination ~s.
Given a game G , let δ : P→ {1, . . . ,m} be a function assigning to each player Pi an integer from
{1, . . . ,m} that corresponds to the number of variables in Vi: i.e.: δ (Pi) = mi. δ is called a variable
distribution function. Given a game G , the type of G is the triple 〈n,m,δ 〉, where n is the number of
players, m is the number of variables in V, and δ is the variable distribution function for G .
Definition 3.2 (Class) Let G and G ′ be two Łukasiewicz games G and G ′ on Łck of type 〈n,m,δ 〉 and
〈n,m,δ ′〉, respectively. We say that G and G ′ belong to the same class G if there exists a permutation j
of the indices {1, . . . ,n} such that, for all Pi, δ (Pj(i)) = δ ′(Pi).
Notice that what matters in the definition of a type is not which players are assigned certain variables,
but rather their distribution.
Let G be a Łukasiewicz game on Łck. A mixed strategy pii for player Pi is a probability distribution
on the strategy space Si. By pi−i, we denote the tuple of mixed strategies (pi1, . . . ,pii−1,pii+1, . . . ,pin).
P−i denotes the tuple of players (P1, . . . ,Pi−1,Pi+1, . . . ,Pn). Given the mixed strategies (pi1, . . . ,pin), the
expected payoff for Pi of playing pii, when P−i play pi−i, is given by
expϕi(pii,pi−i) = ∑
~s=(s1,...,sn)∈S
((
n
∏
j=1
pi j(s j)
)
· fϕi (~s)
)
3.2 The Logics E(G)
Given a class of games G on Łck, the language of E(G) is defined as follows: (1) The set NModF of non-
modal formulas corresponds to the set of Łck-formulas built from the propositional variables p1, . . . , pm.
(2) The set ModF of modal formulas is built from the atomic modal formulas Eϕ , with ϕ ∈ NModF,
using the connectives of the ŁΠ 12 logic. Eϕ is meant to encode a player’s expected payoff of playing a
mixed strategy, given the payoff function associated to ϕ . Nested modalities are not allowed.
A model M for E(G) is a tuple 〈S,e,{pii}〉, such that:
1. S= S1×·· ·×Sn is the set of all strategy combinations, i.e.
{~s = (s1, . . . ,sn) | (s1, . . . ,sn) ∈ S1×·· ·×Sn}.
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2. e : (NModF× S) → Lk is a valuation of non-modal formulas, such that, for each ϕ ∈ NModF
e(ϕ ,~s) = fϕ(~s), where fϕ is the function associated to ϕ and~s = (s1, . . . ,sn).
3. pii : Si → [0,1] is a probability distribution, for each Pi.
The truth value of a formula Φ in M at~s, denoted ‖Φ‖M,~s, is inductively defined as follows:
1. If Φ is a non-modal formula ϕ ∈ NModF, then ‖ϕ‖M,~s = e(ϕ ,~s),
2. If Φ is an atomic modal formula Eϕ , then ‖Eϕ‖M,~s = expϕ (pi1, . . . ,pin).
3. If Φ is a non-atomic modal formula, its truth value is computed by evaluating its atomic modal
subformulas and then by using the truth functions associated to the ŁΠ 12 -connectives occurring in
Φ.
Since the valuation of a modal formula Φ does not depend on a specific strategy combination but
only on the model M, we will often simply write ‖Φ‖M to denote the valuation of Φ in M.
Theorem 3.3 (Completeness) Let Γ and Φ be a finite modal theory and a modal formula in E(G). Then,
Γ ⊢E(G) Φ if and only if for every model M such that, for each Ψ ∈ Γ, ‖Ψ‖M = 1, also ‖Φ‖M = 1.
4 Expectation Games
In this section we introduce a class of games with polynomial constraints over expectations. These games
expand Lukasiewicz games by assigning to each player a formula Φi of E(G), whose interpretation corre-
sponds to a piecewise rational polynomial function whose variables are expected values. The formula Φi
is meant to represent a player’s goal concerning the relation between her and other players’ expectations.
Definition 4.1 An Expectation Game EG on E(G) is a tuple EG = 〈G ,{Mi},{Φi}〉, where:
1. G is a Łukasiewicz game on Łck, with G ∈G,
2. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, Mi is the set of all mixed strategies on Si of player Pi,
3. for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, Φi is an E(G)-formula such that every atomic modal formula occurring in
Φi has the form Eψ , with ψ ∈ {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn}, i.e. the payoff formulas in G .
A model M = 〈S,e,{pii}〉 of E(G) for a game EG is called a best response model for a player Pi
whenever, for all models M′ = 〈S,e,{pi ′i}〉 with pi ′−i = pi−i,
‖Φi‖M′ ≤ ‖Φi‖M.
An expectation game EG on E(G) is said to have a Nash Equilibrium, whenever there exists a model
M∗ that is a best response model for each player Pi. In that case M∗ is called an equilibrium model.
Example 1. Let EG be any expectation game where each Pi is simply assigned the formula Φi := Eϕi.
This game corresponds to the the situation where each player cares only about her own expectation and
whose goal is its maximisation. Clearly, by Nash’s Theorem [11], every EG of this form admits an
Equilibrium, since it offers a formalisation of the classical case where equilibria are given by tuples of
mixed strategies over valuations in a Łukasiewicz game.
Example 2. Not every expectation game has an equilibrium. In fact, consider the following game
EG = 〈P,V,{Vi},{Si},{ϕi},{Mi},{Φi}〉, with i ∈ {1,2}, where:
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(1) ϕ1 := p1 and ϕ2 := p2, and (2) Φ1 := ¬d(E(p1),E(p2)) and Φ2 := d(E(p1),E(p2)).2
The above game can be regarded as a particular version of Matching Pennies with expectations. In fact,
while P1 aims at matching P2’s expectation, P2 wants their expectations to be as far as possible. It is easy
to see that there is no model M that gives an equilibrium for EG . Therefore:
Proposition 4.2 There exist Expectation Games on E(G) that do not admit a Nash Equilibrium.
5 Complexity
Definition 5.1 For a given game EG , the MEMBERSHIP problem is the problem of determining whether
there exists an equilibrium model M. For a given game EG and model M with with rational mixed
strategies (pi1, . . . ,pin), the NON-EMPTINESS problem is the problem of determining whether M belongs
to the set of Nash Equilibria.
Recall that the first-order theory Th(R) of real closed fields is the set of sentences in the language of
ordered rings 〈+,−, ·,0,1,<〉 that are valid over the field of reals [8]. The existence of an equilibrium in
a game EG can be expressed through a first-order sentence ξ of Th(R):
Proposition 5.2 For each Expectation Game EG there exists a first-order sentence ξ of the theory Th(R)
of real closed fields so that EG admits a Nash Equilibrium if and only if ξ holds in Th(R).
As a consequence of the above, it is easy to see that a game EG admits an equilibrium if and only if there
exists a quantifier-free formula in the language of ordered rings that defines a non-empty semialgebraic
set over the reals [8].
We exploit the connection with Th(R) to determine the computational complexity of both the MEM-
BERSHIP and the NON-EMPTINESS problem. In fact, given a game EG , it can be shown that the sentence
ξ can be computed from EG but its length is exponential in the number of propositional variables of the
payoff formulas φi. Deciding the validity of a sentence in Th(R) is singly exponential in the number of
variables and doubly exponential in the number of alternations of quantifier blocks [5]. It can be shown
that for every game the alternation of quantifiers in ξ is always fixed. As a consequence, we obtain:
Theorem 5.3 Given an Expectation Game EG the NON-EMPTINESS problem can be decided in 2-
EXPTIME.
Deciding the validity of a sentence with only existential quantifiers in Th(R) can be solved in
PSPACE [1]. We can show that, given a game EG and model M with rational mixed strategies (pi1, . . . ,pin),
we can compute in polynomial time an existential sentence of Th(R) whose validity is equivalent to the
fact that M is an equilibrium model.
Theorem 5.4 Given an Expectation Game EG and a model M with rational mixed strategies (pi1, . . . ,pin),
the MEMBERSHIP problem can be decided in PSPACE.
2 Where ¬d(E(p1),E(p2)) is interpreted as 1− |expp1 (pi1,pi2)− expp2(pi1,pi2)| and d(E(p1),E(p2)) as |expp1(pi1,pi2)−
expp2 (pi1,pi2)| (see [4]).
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6 Extensions and Future Work
This work lends itself to several extensions and generalizations. On the one hand we plan to study
the notion of correlated equilibria for Expectation Games as well as to determine the complexity of
checking their existence. In addition, we are interested in studying games where an external agent can
exert influence on the game by imposing constraints on the payoffs and the expectations. This agent
would then play the role of an enforcer by pushing the players to make choices that agree with her
dispositions. Also, we plan to investigate games based on infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic [2] where
players have infinite strategy spaces. Finally, we intend to explore possible relations with stochastic
games and whether our framework can be adapted to formalize those kinds of strategic interactions.
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